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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING BELOW 
The defendants (collectively the "State" unless other-
wise indicated) issued an audit of State Coal Lease No. 22729 
(the "State Lease") to the plaintiffs (collectively "Plateau" 
unless otherwise indicated) and demanded payment of alleged 
unpaid royalties. Plateau filed a complaint for declaratory 
judgment against the State challenging the audit. This appeal is 
brought by the State from the District Court's Memorandum Deci-
sion and Declaratory Judgment granting summary judgment for 
Plateau. The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has jurisdiction 
to hear this appeal under Utah Code sections 78-2-2(3)(e)(iii) 
and 78-2-2(3)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The issues presented for review on this appeal are as 
follows: 
1. Whether the District Court properly: 
(a) found the royalty provision in the State 
Lease to be ambiguous; 
(b) construed the royalty provision in light of 
the parties' course of conduct, which interpreted the royalty 
rate to be $0.15 per ton; 
1
 In accord with Rule 24(b) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court, Plateau includes its own statement of issues because it is 
dissatisfied with the State's distorted and argumentative state-
ment of issues. 
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(c) found the royalty provision was not 
self-executing; 
(d) applied the doctrine of equitable estoppel 
against the State; 
(e) found that the State may not retroactively 
apply its new policy imposing a royalty rate of 8%; 
(f) found that the State's new royalty policy is 
a rule which is invalid because of the State's failure to follow 
the provisions of the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act; 
(g) found that the State waived its right to 
demand payment of royalties on coal mined during the Audit Period 
at any rate higher than $0.15 per ton; 
(h) found that the State is not entitled to 
interest on any royalty payment deficiencies; 
(i) found that the State is not entitled to 
penalties for any royalty payment deficiencies; and 
(j) found that the prevailing federal royalty 
rate during the Audit Period was not 8%. 
-2-
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This lawsuit centers on the State's claim against 
Plateau for royalties alleged to be due under the State Lease for 
the period of April lr 1979 to December 31, 1984 (the "Audit 
Period"). The State Lease, entered into on March 15, 1965, 
provides that a royalty is to be paid to the State of Utah at the 
rate of $0.15 per ton or the rate prevailing for federal land of 
similar character under coal leases, whichever is higher (R. 
144-45). The State Lease was originally applied for and 
approved by the Board of State Lands and Forestry (the "Board") 
at a royalty rate of $0.15 per ton (R. 144, 368-69, 499). 
2
 The State's Statement of the Case, and its entire Brief, is 
riddled with assertions of fact without references to the Record, 
as required by Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, Rule 24(a)(7), 
and which are in fact unsupported by the Record. Appendix "A" is 
a list of such unsupported assertions. The Court has held that 
if the appellant fails to provide adequate citations to the rec-
ord, the judgment of the lower court is presumed to be correct. 
Fackrell v. Fackrell, 740 P.2d 1318, 1319 (Utah 1987). 
3 Article III, Paragraph 2 of the State Lease provides that a 
production royalty would be paid: 
(a) at the rate of 15£ per ton of 2000 lbs. 
of coal produced from the leased premises and 
sold or otherwise disposed of, or 
(b) at the rate prevailing, at the beginning 
of the quarter for which payment is being 
made, for federal lessees of land of similar 
character under coal leases issued by the 
United States at that time, 
whichever is higher 
-3-
Plateau and its predecessors mined under the State 
Lease on a regular basis from the date the lease was entered into 
until December, 1984 (R. 146, 369, 499). At all times when 
mining was conducted under the State Lease, and during the entire 
Audit Period, Plateau paid royalties, and the State accepted 
royalties, at the rate of $0.15 per ton (R. 146, 369, 500). This 
rate was clearly reflected in each royalty statement submitted by 
Plateau and its predecessors with each payment before and during 
the Audit Period (R. 146). The State accepted the royalty 
payments and royalty statements each quarter without objection 
(R. 146-47, 369, 500). The lower court found that this 
long-standing and unvarying course of conduct over a span of 
nearly twenty years established a $0.15 per ton royalty rate for 
the Audit Period (R. 677). 
In 1980, during the Audit Period, the State represented 
to Plateau that the State Lease was in good standing, but for the 
failure to pay 1980 rentals (R. 147, 369-70, 500). In 1985, 
before plaintiff Cyprus Western Coal Equipment Company ("Cyprus") 
acquired Plateau, it reviewed the file maintained by the State on 
the State Lease and questioned State personnel about the status 
of the State Lease (R. 148). Nothing in the file indicated that 
Plateau had underpaid the royalty due under the State Lease (R. 
148, 370, 500). The State personnel represented to Cyprus that 
the State Lease was in good standing (R. 148). 
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In an October 15, 1985 letter to Plateau, the State 
announced a new policy relating to coal royalties. In those 
letters, the State asserted that under subparagraph (b) of the 
royalty provision (the "prevailing federal rate clause"), royal-
ties for the Audit Period were due at the rate of 8% of the value 
of coal mined. According to the State, under the Federal Coal 
Lease Amendments Act of 1976 ("FCLAA"), and the regulations 
promulgated thereunder, the prevailing rate during the Audit 
Period for all underground federal coal mining operations was 8% 
of the coal value. (R. 149). The State demanded payment of 
4
 The contention that federal law requires an 8% royalty rate 
for all underground federal coal leases is based upon a misread-
ing of the regulation upon which the State relies. That regula-
tion provides: 
A lease shall require payment of a royalty 
rate of not less than 8 percentum of the 
value of the coal removed from an underground 
mine, except that the authorized officer may 
determine a lesser amount, but in no case 
less than 5 percent if conditions warrant. 
43 C.F.R. S 3473.3-2(a)(3) (1986). This regulation does not, as 
the State contends, provide for an 8% royalty rate on all 
underground federal coal leases. Rather, it requires the Depart-
ment of the Interior to consider whether a rate of between 5% and 
8% should be imposed. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has 
recently ruled that this is the clear meaning of the regulation 
in Coastal States Energy Co. v. Hodel, 816 F.2d 502 (10th Cir. 
1987). In that case, the court considered the Department of 
Interior's assertion that upon the 20-year readjustment of 
federal coal leases, the provisions of the regulation require the 
imposition of an 8% rate. The court rejected this assertion out 
of hand and ruled that the regulation does not "automatically 
fix" a royalty rate of 8% for all under-
Footnote continued on next page. 
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$1,916,909.27 for alleged royalty underpayment, $1,058,545.32 for 
accrued interest, $16,158.85 as a penalty, and additional accrued 
interest (R. 149, 240). 
The District Court granted Plateau's Motion for Partial 
5 
Summary Judgment on the issue of liability for the alleged 
deficiency and denied the State's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment (R. 680). The State filed this appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Each argument numbered 1 through 6 below is made in the 
alternative because each provides an independent basis for 
upholding the District Court's decision. 
1. The prevailing federal rate clause is ambiguous on 
its face because it is susceptible to numerous possible interpre-
tations. The parties' course of performance indicates that they 
chose not to attempt to apply this ambiguous provision and to 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
ground coal leases, but rather the Department is required to 
consider royalty rates in the range of 5% to 8%. id. at 507. 
Thus, even if the State could apply its new royalty policy 
retroactively, that policy would be invalid because it is based 
upon a misunderstanding of the federal law regarding underground 
royalty rates. 
5
 Plateau's Motion was partial because it did not include subpar-
agraphs 36(h) and (i) of its Complaint relating to the determina-
tion of the value of coal (R. 11). These issues are moot if the 
Court upholds the lower court's decision. 
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relied instead on subparagraph (a) of the royalty provision, 
which provides for a royalty of $0.15 per ton. 
2. The prevailing federal rate clause is not 
self-executing. Plateau had no duty to pay royalties under the 
prevailing federal rate clause unless and until there was an 
agreement between the State and Plateau as to the applicable 
royalty under that provision. 
3. The State is estopped from attempting to retroac-
tively invoke the prevailing federal rate clause. In electing to 
mine coal from the State Lease, Plateau relied on the State's 
acceptance of $0.15 per ton without objection and the State 
representations that the State Lease was in good standing. 
Cyprus relied on the State's representations of good standing 
when it acquired Plateau in 1985. If the State is allowed to 
repudiate its long-standing practice and retroactively apply the 
prevailing federal rate clause, Plateau will suffer great finan-
cial injury. Any loss to the school trust fund that may result 
from estopping the State does not constitute a substantial 
adverse effect on public policy that would outweigh the injury to 
Plateau if the State is not estopped. 
4. The State's newly formed interpretation of the 
prevailing federal rate clause amounts to a policy that the State 
has attempted to apply retroactively in contravention to the well 
established rule that, when prior agency policies have been 
-7-
relied upon, new policies will not be applied retroactively to 
the detriment of the relying parties. 
5. Because it has general applicability, the State's 
new royalty policy is a rule which, absent compliance with the 
Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, is invalid and may not be 
applied prospectively, much less retrospectively. 
6. Because the State was aware of the prevailing 
federal rate clause but failed to invoke it in a timely manner, 
the State voluntarily relinquished and consequently waived its 
right to demand royalty payments at a rate higher than $0.15 per 
ton. 
7. The State's attempt to apply its interest and 
penalty rules, which were promulgated after the parties entered 
into the State Lease, is contrary to the express terms of the 
lease and therefore invalid. 
8. The State is not entitled to summary judgment that 
8% of gross sales value is the applicable royalty under the 
prevailing federal rate clause during the Audit Period because 
there are issues of material fact that must be resolved before 
such a determination can be made. If this Court holds against 
Plateau on arguments 1-6 above, a trial would be necessary to 
determine the applicable royalty rate under the prevailing 
federal rate clause. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. AN ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS STANDARD OF 
REVIEW IS INAPPLICABLE IN THIS CASE. 
In the section of its Brief entitled "Standard of 
Review," the State asserts that the issues before this Court were 
decided against Plateau by the Director of the Division of State 
Lands and Forestry (the "Director" and the "Division"), and that 
the Director's decision should not be overturned unless it is 
found to be arbitrary or capricious. This argument is based on 
erroneous factual and legal premises and was not accepted by the 
District Court. 
Following the issuance of the Audit Report and demand 
for payment, Plateau sent a protest letter to the Director in 
January of 1986 (R. 497-98). On March 4, 1986, the Director 
responded in a one-page letter summarily rejecting Plateau's 
argument (R. 498). There was no hearing; no legal memoranda, 
affidavits or exhibits were received. The decision was based 
solely on the Audit Report and Plateau's protest letter, and the 
Director merely reaffirmed the position he had previously taken 
in the Audit Report. The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that 
where, as here, there is no record for the court to review, other 
than plaintiffs1 protest and the agency's decision, and a com-
plete airing of the issues and facts was not had before the 
agency, the court must conduct an independent inquiry and may not 
simply defer to the agency's naked decision. Denver & Rio Grande 
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Western Railroad Co, v, Central Weber Sewer Improvement Dist., 4 
Utah 2d 105, 287 P.2d 884, 887 (1955). 
Moreover, this case involves issues of contract con-
struction and statutory interpretation and the application of 
equitable principles, areas in which courts do not accord agen-
cies any deference. Because these issues are wholly outside the 
Director's expertise, the Court must make its own "independent 
determination of the correct application of the governing princi-
ples." Texas Gas Transmission Corp. v. Shell Oil Co.r 363 U.S. 
263, 270 (I960); see also Adkins v. Division of State Lands, 719 
P.2d 524, 526 (Utah 1986) (on questions of statutory construction 
involving pure questions of law, no deference is accorded agency 
determination). The Director's decision turned on issues as to 
which the Division has no expertise, was based on the most super-
ficial of inquiries, and was made by an interested party, rather 
than an impartial decisionmaker. Accordingly, it is not entitled 
to deference from this Court. 
Aside from the matter discussed above, Plateau agrees 
with the State that the Court need not defer to the District 
Court in deciding the issues of law presented in this case. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT PLA-
TEAU WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED 
ON THE UNDISPUTED FACTS AND THE LAW. 
A. The District Court Properly Found the 
Royalty Provision to be Ambiguous. 
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The State asserts that the District Court held that the 
royalty provision is ambiguous "because the escalator clause 
required plaintiffs to determine the prevailing rate from facts 
outside the lease". Appellants1 Brief at 19. This is a gross 
misstatement of the District Court's Memorandum Decision. The 
District Court found the royalty provision to be ambiguous 
because it is susceptible of several different interpretations. 
The case law supports this conclusion that the royalty provision 
of the State Lease is ambiguous as a matter of law because it is 
susceptible of many varying and inconsistent interpretations. 
See Russell v. Valentine, 14 Utah 2d 26, 376 P.2d 548 (1962); 
Crestview Bowl, Inc. v. Womer Construction Co.f Inc., 225 Kan. 
335, 592 P.2d 74 (1979). 
Several phrases of the prevailing federal rate clause 
of the royalty provision are ambiguous. One is the term 
6 "Part (b) leaves the amount due based on several factors not 
immediately capable of definitive determination. The ambiguity 
arises as much from what is not stated and provided as from what 
is stated. In other words, at the beginning of the reporting 
quarter what is the prevailing federal rate and who makes that 
determination, the lessor or the lessee, and what factors are to 
be included in making a determination as what federal rate pre-
vails and in what area is it prevalent? Who makes the determina-
tion that the land in the State Lease and the land in the Federal 
Lease are similar in character and what is the basis for deter-
mining similarity? What time period is used to determine federal 
leases "issued . . . at that time" and who makes that determina-
tion? Even if a prevailing federal rate is established, does it 
apply to the "value of the coal removed" as stated in the federal 
regulation or to the "gross sales value" as used by the State 
auditor in his assessment, and who makes that determination?" 
(R. 676); see also Appendix "B" attached hereto. 
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requiring royalty payments on the State Lease to be matched to 
royalty payments on federal "land of a similar character." 
"Similar character11 may mean land with the same quality of coal, 
land with the same geologic formation, or land where the costs of 
mining and transportation are similar. It also is unclear to 
which geographical area the clause refers. For example, the 
clause could refer to federal coal leases issued in the same 
drainage, the same county, the same state, the same region or 
across the nation. Nor is it clear what is meant by "coal leases 
issued by the United States at that time." Use of the phrase "at 
that time" creates uncertainty. Does this mean newly issued 
leases or all leases in effect during the reporting quarter? 
Does it refer only to producing leases? Finally, it is not clear 
what is meant by "rate prevailing." "Prevailing" is defined by 
Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1971) as: 
1: having superior force or influence: 
Efficacious (the - doctrine of wind) 2a: most 
frequent (windows facing the - wind) b: 
generally current: common (adapted a loose 
structure of - ideas to the needs of his own 
temperament —M.D. Geismar). 
In the context of the prevailing federal rate clause, prevailing 
appears to mean the most frequent or common federal royalty 
7 
rate. Even the use of this definition creates an ambiguity. 
7
 This also appears to be the State's interpretation of "pre-
vailing." They have asserted 8% to be the "prevailing" rate, 
Footnote continued on next page. 
-12-
What does the most frequent or common rate mean? More than fifty 
percent? What if the breakdown for lease rates was 33 1/3% at 
$0.15 per ton, 33 1/3% at $0,175 per ton and 33 1/3% at 8%? Was 
it the lessee's duty to obtain current lease rates from BLM each 
quarter? What geographical area was to be considered? Some of 
the numerous possible interpretations of the various terms in the 
prevailing federal rate clause are listed in the chart attached 
hereto as Appendix nB,?. When the various interpretations of the 
key phrases in the clause are combined, there are at least 972 
g 
distinct interpretations of the clause as a whole. 
The underground royalty rates for federal coal leases 
in Utah that were in effect during the Audit Period varied from 
$0.10 per ton to 12.50% of value (R. 496). Federal coal leases 
during the same time period across the nation had the same range 
of royalty rates (R. 496). In order to determine the most common 
federal coal lease royalty rate, Plateau would have had to survey 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
because they try to achieve some arithmetical majority by assert-
ing that the royalty rate in 19 of 24 newly issued federal coal 
leases during the Audit Period is 8%. See Appellants1 Brief at 
20. 
8 As set forth in Appendix "B", there are four phrases in the 
clause that are each susceptible of numerous interpretations. 
Using mathematics, the number of interpretations of the entire 
clause is equivalent to the number of combinations of the differ-
ent interpretations of each phrase, which is 972 distinct 
combinations. 
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all currently issued federal coal leases either at the Utah State 
Office or the Washington office of BLM, and survey these leases 
at least quarterly (and there were over 200 federal coal leases 
in Utah in effect during the Audit Period (R. 496-97)). However, 
even if Plateau had gathered this information, it would have been 
impossible for Plateau to determine the prevailing rate because 
of the ambiguities in the prevailing federal rate clause. Even 
if Plateau had considered only the federal coal leases in Utah 
that it held or ones in which it had an ownership interest, the 
royalty rates ranged from $0.15 per ton to 8% (R. 496). 
Because of these numerous ambiguities, the royalty 
provision does not have a plain meaning as the State asserts. 
Furthermore, if the provision has only one meaning and is so 
straightforward, why is it that none of the owners of the other 
five producing state coal leases with similar royalty clauses 
interpreted the provision according to the State's reading (R. 
153, 156, 372-73, 502-03)?9 Plateau submits that even if it had 
unilaterally attempted to apply the clause during the Audit 
Period, it nonetheless would be in court today because the State 
9
 Three other cases involving the same royalty provision and 
similar facts have been filed against the State, decided in favor 
of the lessee by the District Court and appealed to the Court by 
the State: Blackhawk Coal Company v. The Utah Division of State 
Lands and Forestry, Utah Supreme Court, Case No. 880215; Consoli-
dation Coal Company v. The Utah Division of State Lands and For-
estry, Utah Supreme Court, Case No. 880243; Trail Mountain Coal 
Company v. The Utah Division of State Lands and Forestry, Utah 
Supreme Court, Case No. 880300. 
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at that time had no idea what the clause meant (R. 154-55, 373, 
503) and today with hindsight would probably not agree with such 
action. 
The State asserts that the prevailing rate clause is an 
escalator clause or "favored nation" clause and that escalator 
clauses are not ambiguous "if there is a formula or method to set 
the price." See Appellants1 Brief at 19. However, the State 
ignores the fact that there is not an objective formula or method 
to set the prevailing royalty because the prevailing federal rate 
clause is susceptible of so many different interpretations. The 
cases cited by the State for the proposition that courts uphold 
favored nation clauses involve clauses that are unambiguous. See 
Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power and Light Co., 459 
U.S. 400 (1983); Amoco Production Company v. Stauffer Chemical 
Co. of Wyoming, 612 P.2d 463 (Wyo. 1980); Lonestar Gas Co. v. The 
Howard Corp., 556 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. 1977). 
The State's own officers and employees have acknowl-
edged that the royalty provision is ambiguous. In addition, 
the Division has demonstrated that the royalty provision is 
1 0
 Consolidation Coal Company is presently involved in a simi-
lar lawsuit with the State even though it reached an agreement in 
1981 that the prevailing federal rate was $0,175 per ton. (R. 
156). See supra, fn.9. 
11
 The following officers and employees of the Division 
acknowledged during discovery in Trail Mountain Coal Company v. 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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ambiguous by itself adopting different interpretations. Prior to 
1985, the Division interpreted the prevailing federal rate clause 
to include only those federal leases that were producing in the 
same area. The Division was not sure of the meaning of "same 
area" but would have recommended to the Board that it mean a 
"particular drainage area" (R. 154-55). In contrast, the State 
now interprets the royalty provision in this case to have another 
meaning: the State now views the royalty rate to be 8%, relying 
in part on all federal leases which have been issued or adjusted 
within the State of Utah since January 1979, regardless of 
whether such leases are in production. 
the royalty provision mystified other agencies of the 
state. In 1977, the Legislative Auditor General requested an 
opinion from the Office of Legislative General Counsel on the 
meaning of "land of a similar character" within the context of 
the royalty provision (R. 151-52, 372, 502). The resulting 
Legislative General Counsel Opinion dated April 8, 1977 concluded 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
The Utah Division of State Lands and Forestry, District Court 
Case No. 4847, a case involving a state coal lease containing an 
identical royalty provision (R. 153), that the royalty provision 
is ambiguous: Ralph A. Miles, Director of the Division; Donald 
G. Prince, Assistant Director of the Division; and John Thomas 
Blake, Mineral Resources Specialist with the Division (R. 
621-24). The Division itself admitted that Mr. Miles "is or was 
of the opinion that the royalty provision . . . is ambiguous" (R. 
624). 
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that "[l]and of similar character is sufficiently vague to defy 
definition" with the following analysis: 
As used in Article III, SECOND, (c), of 
the attached lease, the term "land of similar 
character" is so vague as to defy reasonable 
definition. Initially the problem becomes 
one of kind, i.e. similar in what regard — 
size, productivity, value. Assuming argu-
endo, that similarity can be established, the 
second problem arises when it is attempted to 
establish the magnitude of the lands availa-
ble for comparison i.e. does the land have to 
be similar to land in the same county, state, 
region or is the entire United States availa-
ble for comparative similarities. 
Without further explanation in the lease 
itself or without knowing the intent of the 
parties, any definition given herein would be 
totally inconclusive. Thus, since the term 
"land of similar character" could be inter-
preted to have several different meanings, it 
is ambiguous. 
(R. 152, 372, 502). In short, the Opinion concluded that the 
phrase "land of a similar character" is ambiguous because it has 
numerous meanings. 
It is patently obvious that the prevailing federal rate 
clause is capable of numerous meanings and interpretations. 
Thus, the royalty provision is ambiguous as a matter of law. 
B. The District Court Did Not Rewrite the 
Lease; It Properly Construed the Royalty 
Provision in Light of the Parties' 
Course of Performance Interpreting the 
Royalty Rate to be $0.15 Per Ton. 
The State contends that the royalty provision clearly 
provides that the applicable federal royalty rate during the 
Audit Period was 8% and that the District Court thus erred in 
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construing the royalty provision according to the parties' course 
of conduct. The State presents general rules of contract con-
struction in support of its interpretation. See Appellants1 
Brief at 22. Many of the State's cases do not stand for the rule 
12 
of construction for which they are cited. Further, the State 
totally ignores the rule of construction that the courts look to 
the interpretation of the parties by their course of conduct to 
construe ambiguous contracts (the rule of practical construc-
tion). Zeese v. Estate of Siegel, 534 P.2d 85 (Utah 1975); 
Ackerman v. Sterling Paving Co., 497 P.2d 699 (Colo. App. 1972); 
see Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Shonk Land Co., 169 W. Va. 310, 288 
S.E.2d 139 (1982). 
In Ackerman, the lessor brought an action to recover an 
alleged deficiency in royalties under a sand and gravel lease. 
The Colorado Court of Appeals concluded that the lease was 
ambiguous as to the amount of royalties and held that the 
1 2
 Utah Valley Bank v. Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060, 1061 (Utah 1981), 
does not hold that "the intent of the parties when entering into 
the contract controls the meaning of the contract." Appellants1 
Brief at 22. Naqle v. Club Fontainbleu, 17 Utah 2d 125, 405 P.2d 
346, 348 (1965), holds that "[w]here the intent and purpose can 
be ascertained, it should be enforced in accordance with its sub-
stance." Hal Taylor Associates v. UnionAmerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 
743, 749 (Utah 1982), holds that "[t]his Court will not rewrite a 
contract to supply terms which the parties omitted," and that 
"the first source of inquiry must be the document itself, consid-
ered in its entirety." The holding in Public Service Co. v. City 
and County of Denver, 153 Colo. 396, 387 P.2d 33, 36 (1963), that 
a contract must be construed liberally to protect the public 
interest, is limited to public utility franchise agreements. 
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lessor's continued acceptance of royalty payments under the 
lessee's interpretation of the lease was dispositive. 479 P.2d 
at 700-01. The reviewing court found that the evidence supported 
the trial court's finding: 
That the parties by their conduct before the 
dispute arose, have interpreted the lease in 
accordance with [lessee's] construction of 
its meaning and that the plaintiffs for over 
three years, at least since the receiving of 
the summary schedule, . . . have adopted 
defendant's construction of the lease and 
acquiesced in such construction . . . ; that 
[lessor's] . . . took no sufficient or 
positive action to establish their now 
asserted construction of the lease. 
id. at 700. 
In accord with Ackerman is Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. 
Shonk Land Co., 169 W. Va. 310, 288 S.E.2d 139 (1982). There the 
lessor, after ten years of accepting royalty payments under the 
lessee's interpretation of a coal lease, brought an action to 
recover alleged deficiencies, arguing that the lessee had incor-
rectly interpreted the lease. The court upheld the lessee's 
construetion, stating: 
Our interpretation that royalty payments 
were to be made on railroad weights and not 
run-of-mine coal . . . is consistent with 
[the lessee's] conduct. [The lessor's] ten 
year failure to object to those royalty 
calculations reinforces our reversal of the 
trial court's determination that royalties 
were due on the run-of-mine coal. 
Id. at 146 (footnote omitted); see also Kretni Development Co. v. 
Consolidated Oil Corp., 74 F.2d 497 (10th Cir. 1934) (party who 
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received royalty payments on oil and gas lease based on royalty 
rate of 7-1/2% for almost eight years held bound to parties1 
course of conduct in interpreting royalty provision); cert. 
denied, 295 U.S. 750; Champlin Petroleum Co. v. Ingram, 560 F.2d 
994, 998 (10th Cir. 1977) (parties' construction of ambiguous oil 
and gas lease royalty provision for 30 years upheld where both 
parties had knowledge of the construction), cert, denied, 436 
U.S. 958 (1978). 
The parties' course of performance indicates that, 
because of the ambiguity of the prevailing federal rate clause, 
the parties did not attempt to apply this ambiguous clause but 
chose to base payments on the rate of $0.15 per ton. Contrary to 
the State's position, the District Court did not rewrite the 
13 
contract; it simply followed the parties' course of conduct. 
The State also asserts that the parties' course of 
conduct is not an interpretation of the clause, but a modifica-
tion of the clause. See Appellants' Brief at 25. Regardless of 
1 3
 The State contends that the District Court's basing a ruling 
on the parties' course of dealing was tantamount to rewriting the 
Lease and that the Lease cannot be rewritten without approval of 
the Director, the Board or the Attorney General. The statutes 
cited by the State do not in any way indicate that the Director, 
the Board or the Attorney General have exclusive authority to 
speak for the Division. Under section 65-1-1 of the Utah Code, 
the Board is granted policy making authority over state lands. 
The authority to administer state leases is vested in the Divi-
sion. Applying the royalty provision of a mineral lease is an 
administrative function. Further, the Director cannot personally 
administer all of the State's mineral leases. This function was, 
in effect, delegated to the Director's staff. 
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whether the parties' conduct is termed an interpretation or a 
modification, case law supports the proposition that the parties' 
course of conduct governs the construction of a contract. 
Webster's Red Seal Publications, Inc. v. Gilberton World-Wide 
Publications, Inc., 67 A.D.2d 339, 415 N.Y.S.2d 229 (1979), 
aff'd, 53 N.Y.2d 643, 438 N.Y.S.2d 998, 421 N.E.2d 118 (1981). 
In this case Webster sold its magazine publishing rights to 
Gilberton in 1962. The 1962 sales agreement required Gilberton 
to pay Webster $1000 per issue for five years plus $0.05 per copy 
for all copies in excess of 70,000 copies sold of each issue. In 
1963 the parties modified the 1962 agreement by letter agreement 
to reduce the payments, except that if the cover price increased 
above $0.35 per copy, the original payment terms in the 1962 
agreement would be reinstated (the "price proviso"). In 1970, 
the cover price exceeded $0.35 per copy, but until 1974 Gilberton 
continued to pay and Webster continued to accept payments at the 
post-1963 agreement rates. Webster brought suit to recover 
additional payments due under the 1962 agreement. The court 
viewed the agreements to be ambiguous and denied Webster's claims 
based on the rule of practical construction. The court inter-
preted the contract according to the parties' course of conduct 
of ignoring the price provision, which the court viewed as a 
modification implied in fact. Id. at 230. In the present case, 
the course of conduct of the State and Plateau establishes as a 
matter of law that the parties interpreted the royalty provision 
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of the State Lease to mean that the royalty rate was $0.15 per 
ton." 
The State's assertion that the intent of the royalty 
rate provision was to insure receipt of market value and the 
highest royalty rate paid on federal coal leases is not supported 
15 by the Record. See Appellants' Brief at 19, 23 and 24. 
Furthermore, even if proved to be the parties1 original intent, 
the parties' course of performance is contrary to this intent and 
should be enforced by the Court. As stated by the Utah Supreme 
Court, the "rule of practical construction is predicated on the 
common sense concept that 'actions speak louder than words.'" 
Bullouqh v. Sims, 16 Utah 2d 304, 400 P.2d 20, 23 (1972) (quoting 
Crestview Cemetary Ass'n v. Dieden, 356 P.2d 171 (Cal. I960)). 
Even if the Court were to view the royalty provision to 
be clear on its face, the contract should be interpreted accord-
ing to the parties' course of performance where such course of 
performance is contrary to the wording of the contract. Eie v. 
1 4
 The State asserts, without a reference to the Record, that 
because Plateau does not argue $0.15 is the prevailing federal 
rate, it concedes that the federal rate is higher than the roy-
alty rate paid prior to 1976. See Appellants' Brief at 21 and 
24-25. This assertion is pure supposition and is not supported 
by the Record. Plateau does not concede that the prevailing fed-
eral rate, whatever that may mean, was higher than $0.15 per ton. 
!5 The State does not reference the Record to support its 
assertion. Nor does the State reference the Record to support 
its assertion that the federal royalty rate was $0.15 per ton on 
the date of the State Lease. See Appellants' Brief at 19 and R. 
360, 495. 
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St, Benedict's Hospital, 638 P.2d 1190 (Utah 1981); Bullfrog 
Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 28 Utah 2d 261f 501 P.2d 266 (1972); 
Bui lough v, Simms, 400 P.2d at 23. This rule is based on the 
reasoning that the course of performance creates the ambiguity 
and that a court should not enforce the wording of the contract 
when the parties have demonstrated that they intended the con-
tract to have a different meaning. 
In this casef Plateau and its predecessors paid royal-
ties at the rate of $0.15 per ton, a rate which was clearly 
reflected on the coal production and settlement transmittals sub-
mitted during the Audit Period. The State accepted each payment 
without objection. By these actions of Plateau and the acquies-
cence of the State, the royalty clause as a matter of law 
required the royalty to be paid at the rate of $0.15 per ton. 
C. The District Court Properly Found The 
Royalty Provision Not To Be Self-Execut-
ing. 
The State views the prevailing federal rate provision 
to be self-executing. In other words, the State believes that 
Plateau's duty to pay the "prevailing federal rate," whatever 
that may meanf arose as soon as that rate exceeded $0.15 per tonf 
without any action whatsoever by the State. However, the pre-
vailing federal rate clause could not possibly be self-executing 
when its meaning is not clear on its face. In order to be 
self-executing, the prevailing rate would have to be an identifi-
able fact which could be independently ascertained by either 
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party. The prevailing federal rate clause is not tied to an 
identifiable fact or objective market standard. Thus, the 
prevailing federal rate clause is nothing more than an open price 
provision under which the royalty rate could only be established 
upon agreement, or if not by agreement, then through appropriate 
policy-making or rule-making procedures as discussed infra at 
pages 62-64. 
Not only does the language of the prevailing federal 
rate clause dictate that it is not self-executing, the facts 
indicate that the parties did not intend the provision to be 
self-executing. The Application for the State Lease and Board 
Minutes approving the Application and the issuance of the State 
Lease at the royalty rate of $0.15 per ton indicate that it was 
the intent of the parties that the royalty rate be $0.15 per ton 
until the parties agreed to a higher prevailing federal rate or 
until the State gave Plateau notice and made a fact determination 
of the prevailing federal rate. Furthermore, the letter dated 
February 4, 1985 from the State to Plateau, which outlines the 
terms of readjustment of the State Lease, specifies that the 
"production royalty rate becomes 8% of gross value of the ore" 
(emphasis added) (R. 152, 372, 502). The use of the word 
"becomes" indicates that the rate was not 8% until the readjust-
ment was effective. 
This interpretation that the royalty provision is not 
self-executing is consistent with the State's interpretations of 
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other state coal leases that contain similar royalty provisions 
(R. 153). By letter dated February 15, 1980 to the lessee, the 
State explicitly stated that the royalty provision of the Beaver 
Creek State Lease requires a payment of " . . . 15 cents per ton 
of 2,000 lbs. of coal produced . . ." (ellipsis signals in 
original) (R. 153-54, 373, 503). The failure to mention the 
prevailing federal rate clause of the royalty provision indicates 
that the State viewed the prevailing federal rate clause to be 
inapplicable until the State or the parties took action to invoke 
the clause. 
By letter dated October 4, 1976, the State advised the 
predecessor of Trail Mountain Coal Company that it was the 
State's policy that the royalty rate payable under the royalty 
provision was $0.15 per ton until: 
one of two situations which could alter this 
rate occur. First Part (b) provides that the 
royalty can be changed to the rate payable 
under Federal leases in the same area. This 
change would be made at such time as the 
Federal lease in question begins production. 
(R. 154, 373, 503) (emphasis added). In other words, under the 
State's view espoused in 1976, the rate does not change from 
$0.15 per ton until the State takes action to change it or until 
the parties agree to change it, once there is production on a 
federal lease in the same area. 
The second situation stated in the October 4, 1976 
letter under which the rate can be changed arises when the lease 
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is readjusted at the end of each twenty-year period of the lease 
term. The letter goes on to say: 
Under the provision [governing readjustment], 
the lease terms including the royalty rate, 
will be reviewed as of December 31, 1985, and 
I am sure the rate will be changed to the 
royalty rate in use at that time. 
Thus, it was the intent of the State not to adjust the $0.15 per 
ton royalty rate under the royalty provision until the lease came 
up for readjustment. 
In 1982, Blackhawk Coal Company notified the State that 
royalty payments under the Blackhawk State Lease would continue 
to be based on the $0.15 per ton rate "since the provisions of 
Article 111(b) of this Agreement are inapplicable at the present 
time" (R. 155, 373, 503). Blackhawk paid, and the State accepted 
without objection, royalty payments at the rate of $0.15 per ton 
(R. 155-56, 373, 503). The State's acceptance of and failure to 
object to the royalty rate or the 1982 letter indicates that the 
State agreed that the royalty rate was $0.15 per ton until there 
was a determination or agreement to the contrary. 
The language of the prevailing federal rate clause and 
the conduct of the parties show that the clause was not applica-
ble absent an agreement or alternatively notice and a proper fact 
determination by the State. There was no agreement, no notice 
and no proper and timely fact determination by the State. Thus, 
the only applicable royalty provision in the State Lease was 
subparagraph (a), requiring a royalty of $0.15 per ton. Because 
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Plateau paid $0.15 per ton, it complied with the clear terms of 
the State Lease and owes no additional royalties to the State. 
D. The District Court Properly Applied 
Estoppel Against the State. 
1. The Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel Applies Against 
the State. 
In its most recent opinions discussing the applicabil-
ity of estoppel to the State, the Court has left no doubt that 
the State may be estopped under appropriate circumstances. In 
Celebrity Clubf Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n, 602 P.2d 689 
(Utah 1979), the Court stated that equitable estoppel would apply 
against the State, but that greater caution must be applied when 
the State is acting in its governmental as opposed to proprietary 
capacity. Id. at 694 (quoting Metropolitan Park Dist. v. State 
Dept. of Natural Resources, 85 Wash. 2d 821, 539 P.2d 854 
(1975)). Equitable estoppel may be applied against the State, 
even when it is acting in a governmental capacity "if necessary 
to prevent manifest injustice, and the exercise of governmental 
powers will not be impaired as a result." Id. (quoting West v. 
Dept. of Social and Health Servs., 21 Wash. App. 577, 586 P.2d 
516, 518 (1978). 
In Utah State Univ. v. Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d 715 (Utah 
1982), the Court stated that, as a general rule, estoppel should 
not be applied against the State. But when it is "plainly 
apparent" that the application of this rule would result in 
injustice, and there would be "no substantial adverse effect on 
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public policy," the doctrine applies against the State. Id. at 
718. The opinion also points out that courts are increasingly 
applying estoppel against state agencies, consistent with the 
trend toward holding government and its agencies more responsible 
for their actions. Id. at 718 n.4. 
Recognizing that there is some variation in the 
approaches taken by the Court in these cases, Plateau will 
address the estoppel issue as follows: First, Plateau will 
establish that the State acted in a proprietary or business 
capacity when entering into the State Lease; second, Plateau will 
set forth the elements of estoppel as it would apply to a private 
party and show that each element is satisfied under the undis-
puted facts of this case; third, Plateau will show that it will 
suffer manifest injustice if the State is not estopped; last, 
Plateau will show that estopping the State will not impair the 
exercise of governmental powers or have a substantial adverse 
effect on public policy. This last section will focus on the 
State's erroneous argument that it cannot be estopped in this 
case because to do so would violate the State's trust responsi-
bilities for administering school lands. 
2. The State Acts in a Proprietary Capacity When 
Leasing State Lands. 
Plateau first focuses on the capacity of the State 
because if the Court holds that the State acted in a proprietary 
capacity, the standard for estoppel is less stringent and only 
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the basic elements of estoppel need be satisfied. In Metropoli-
tan Park, cited as authority by the Court in Celebrity Club, 602 
P.2d at 694, the Washington Supreme Court stated: 
It must be remembered that when the State 
functions in its proprietary capacity, it 
will receive no better treatment than any two 
private individuals who bring their dispute 
before the courts for final resolution. 
539 P.2d 859. However, even if the Court views the State as 
acting in a governmental capacity, the two additional elements of 
manifest injustice and no substantial adverse effect on public 
policy are clearly satisfied in this case. 
Contrary to the State's assertion, this Court has never 
held that the State administers leases of public lands to private 
entities in a governmental capacity. On the contrary, the 
Court's only decision on this subject leads to the opposite 
conclusion. In Morgan v. Board of State Lands, 549 P.2d 695 
(Utah 1976), the Court recognized that a lessee of state lands 
may assert estoppel against the Board. Although the Court 
refused to estop the Board on the facts of that case, there was 
no suggestion that the Board was entitled to special deference or 
that it leased public lands in a governmental capacity. Indeed, 
Justice Maughan, dissenting from the majority opinion and 
l b
 It cannot be determined from the opinion whether school 
trust lands were involved in Morgan, but there is no rational 
basis for distinguishing these lands from state lands in general. 
The State is required to hold all public lands in trust for the 
benefit of the public. Utah Const, art XX, S 1. 
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concluding that the facts supported estoppel, was consistent with 
the majority in stating: "Here the State acts to dispose of 
public lands, by lease. It thus acts in its proprietary capacity 
and equitable estoppel is a proper remedy." Id, at 700 (Maughan, 
J., dissenting); accord State v. Horr, 165 Minn. 1, 205 N.W. 444, 
445 (1925) (state receives lands in sovereign capacity to hold in 
trust for school fund, but state acts in proprietary capacity 
when selling timber from such lands and is subject to estoppel); 
Younqstown Mines Corp. v. Prout, 266 Minn. 450, 124 N.W.2d 328, 
344-45 (1963) (state acts in proprietary capacity when it leases 
state land even when, by statute, proceeds from those lands must 
be deposited in permanent school fund); Durell v. Miles, 53 N.M. 
264, 206 P.2d 547, 550 (1949) (state acts in proprietary capacity 
when leasing state lands and is subject to estoppel); see also 
Arizona Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. State, 60 Ariz. 555, 142 
P.2d 212, 213 (1943) (distinguishing lands acquired by state 
under Arizona Enabling Act, which are held in proprietary capac-
ity, from lands acquired by state in tax foreclosure, which are 
held in governmental capacity); Greene v. Esquibel, 58 N.M. 429, 
272 P.2d 330, 336-41 (1954) (same conclusion under New Mexico 
Enabling Act). 
The State cites Duchesne County v. State Tax Commfn, 
104 Utah 365, 140 P.2d 335 (Utah 1943), for the proposition that 
it acts in a governmental capacity when leasing school trust 
lands. In Duchesne County, the county argued that lands acquired 
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by the state through foreclosure of mortgages taken by the state 
to secure loans from the State School Fund were subject to 
taxation. The Court reasoned that the state held title to 
17 
revenues derived from state lands in its governmental capacity, 
and was therefore exempt from taxation by the county. Duchesne 
County dealt with the state's amenability to taxation by a local 
governmental entity; it did not deal with the state's capacity in 
the leasing of public lands to private entities. In Morgan, 
however, the Court has indicated the State acts in a proprietary 
capacity in the latter situation. The leasing of state lands to 
private entities to obtain a profit for the State, far from being 
the paradigm of a governmental function that the State asserts it 
to be, is clearly a proprietary or business activity. 
3. The Elements of Equitable Estoppel are Established 
Under the Undisputed Facts of this Case. 
In Morgan, the Court set forth the elements of 
estoppel: 
Estoppel arises when a party . . . by his 
acts, representations, or admissions, or by 
his silence when he ought to speak, inten-
tionally or through culpable negligence, 
induces another . . . to believe certain 
facts to exist and that such other . . . 
acting with reasonable prudence and dili-
gence, relies and acts thereon so that he 
1 7
 Indeed, the Court made a sweeping statement to the effect 
that the state always acts in a governmental capacity. 140 P.2d 
at 343. This theory has not been followed in subsequent cases. 
On the contrary, the Court has explicitly recognized that the 
state acts in both governmental and proprietary capacities. See, 
e.g., Celebrity Club, 602 P.2d at 694. 
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will suffer an injustice if the former . . . 
is permitted to deny the existence of such 
facts. 
549 P.2d at 697; see also Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor 
Control Comm'n, 602 P.2d 689, 694 (Utah 1979). 
(a) Inducement. Plateau and its predecessors (collec-
tively "Plateau"), mined coal under the State Lease on a regular 
basis for nearly twenty years, through December of 1984. At all 
times during this period, including the Audit Period, Plateau 
paid a royalty of $0.15 per ton of coal mined under the State 
Lease. This rate was clearly reflected in the coal production 
and settlement transmittals submitted by Plateau and its prede-
cessors to the State each quarter. The State reviewed and 
accepted the royalty payments and the coal production and settle-
ment transmittals each quarter without objection. 
In May 1980, James T. Jensen, attorney for Plateau, 
telephoned Donald G. Prince, the Assistant Director of the 
Division, to inquire whether the State Lease was in good stand-
ing. The Division responded with a letter dated May 19, 1980 
from Mr. Prince representing that the State Lease was in good 
standing, but for the failure to pay 1980 rentals (R. 147, 
369-70, 500). Understandably, the letter makes no reference to 
deficient royalty payments, since the Division had not yet 
adopted the 8% theory. 
Cyprus purchased Plateau in August, 1985 (R. 148). In 
an attempt to assure itself of Plateau's ownership of the State 
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Lease and to identify any outstanding liabilities associated with 
the State Lease, Cyprus, prior to consummating the purchase, 
conducted a review of both Plateau's records and the State Lease 
file maintained by the Division (R. 148) • The purpose of this 
examination was in part to ascertain whether the State Lease was 
in good standing and whether all rentals and royalties due under 
the lease had been properly paid (R. 148). Neither the State 
Lease file nor Plateau's own records contained any indication 
that the Division believed that past royalty payments were 
deficient in any respect (R. 148, 370, 500). On May 16, 1985, 
Division personnel orally assured John Stewart, a land man hired 
by Cyprus to conduct a records search, that the State Lease was 
in good standing and that all rental and royalty payments had 
been properly made (R. 148). With these assurances, Cyprus 
consummated the purchase of Plateau on August 30, 1985, unaware 
of the State's position that the State Lease was not in good 
standing and that over $3,000,000 in past royalties, interest and 
penalties were due (R. 148-49, 370, 500). The State failed to 
inform Cyprus of the results of the royalty audit even though it 
was aware of the alleged royalty underpayment by March 6, 1985 
and had completed the royalty audit by May 29, 1985 (R. 149-50, 
370-71, 501). The Division deliberately withheld this informa-
tion from Plateau and Cyprus until October 15, 1985 (R. 150, 371, 
501). 
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The State's only response to these undisputed facts is 
(1) a muted claim that the representations of good standing made 
by the Assistant Director of the Division and other Division 
employees did not mean that royalties were paid in full, and (2) 
an assertion that silence will not support an estoppel. See 
Appellants' Brief at 35. 
The State's first argument smacks of post hoc rational-
ization. The State had no definition of good standing, nor did 
it have any policies regarding determinations of good standing 
(R. 497). Moreover, regardless of how the State now defines a 
representation of good standing, Plateau justifiably construed it 
to be a representation that there was no outstanding deficiency 
in royalty payments and no question as to the manner in which 
Plateau was calculating and paying royalties. 
As to the State's second point, it is clear under Utah 
law that silence when a party ought to speak will support an 
estoppel. See Morgan, 549 P.2d at 697. The essence of the 
State's claim is that it had no duty to do or say anything with 
regard to the royalty provision. This argument is untenable. 
The State drafted the prevailing federal rate clause and included 
it in the State Lease for its own benefit. The record shows that 
the State has long known that the clause is ambiguous. See supra 
pp. 15-17. Because the clause is ambiguous on its face, the 
State could not legitimately have expected Plateau to apply it 
without some agreement as to its meaning. The District Court 
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properly rejected the theory that the prevailing federal rate 
clause was self-executing (R. 677). See supra pp. 23-27. In 
other words, the State was obligated to affirmatively act to 
invoke the clause. 
The State also argues that it had no duty to speak 
because it has "thousands" of mineral leases and therefore cannot 
be expected to determine if its lessees are in compliance with 
the terms of the lease. Appellants1 Brief at 6. While the State 
may have many mineral leases, there were only six coal leases 
that were actually producing during the Audit Period, and the 
18 
royalty provisions in these leases were similar (R. 153, 497). 
No audit was necessary for the State to determine how its six 
producing coal lessees were calculating royalties. The produc-
tion reports and settlement transmittals clearly showed the 
lessees were paying at a cents per ton rate, rather than a 
percentage of value. Even if, as the State claims, it did not 
have enough employees to check each of these leases every time 
payment was made, this does not justify its failure to raise any 
question concerning the manner in which its lessees were inter-
preting the leases, particularly when the State knew at the time 
it was receiving payments that the prevailing federal rate clause 
was ambiguous. 
18 Five lessees were audited. The sixth was not because it 
went bankrupt prior to the audit (R. 452). 
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A case in which a private party lessor was estopped 
from demanding higher royalty payments on an oil and gas lease 
than were paid by the lessee supports Plateau's position that the 
State should be estopped under these facts. La Fitte Co. v. 
United Fuel Gas Co., 177 F. Supp. 52 (E.D. Ky. 1959) , aff'd, 284 
F.2d 845 (6th Cir. I960), involved an ambiguous royalty provision 
which provided that the royalty was one-eighth of the gross 
income received by lessee but did not specify either the place of 
market or the price to be paid. Over the course of the lease, 
the lessee made royalty payments based on the wholesale market 
price at the wellhead. The lessor accepted the payments, with 
full knowledge of the basis for payment, without objection. The 
lessor brought an action for underpayment of royalties. The 
court dismissed the complaint and held that the lessor was 
estopped from demanding higher royalty payments: 
By retention of the royalty checks and 
accounting statements by the plaintiff and 
its predecessors, without any objection 
whatever, for the long period of years (1924 
to 1952), and all of the accompanying circum-
stances discussed by the court, the defenses 
of equitable estoppel and laches are sus-
tained. Where the lessee renders to the 
lessor monthly accounts and makes payments 
based thereon which the lessor receives and 
keeps without objection, such accounts are 
conclusive on the lessor, in the absence of 
full and satisfactory evidence of fraud or 
mistake. 
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177 F. Supp. at 68. Likewise, the State is estopped from demand-
ing payment of royalties on coal mined during the Audit Period at 
any rate higher than $0.15 per ton. 
The State clearly had a duty to speak in a timely 
manner if it believed the prevailing federal rate clause was 
applicable. The State's silence alone would support estoppel in 
this case. When that silence is combined with the State's 
acceptance of royalty payments for nearly twenty years and its 
representations of good standing, the first element of estoppel 
is unquestionably established. 
(b) Reasonable Reliance. Plateau relied on the 
State's acts, representations and silence in continuing to mine 
coal under the State Lease (R. 150-51). Moreover, given the 
ambiguities of the prevailing federal rate clause, given the 
State's actions and statements indicating that $0.15 per ton was 
the applicable royalty rate, and given the lack of any reason to 
act to the contrary, Plateau did what any prudent and diligent 
19 lessee would do: it paid royalties at the $0.15 per ton rate. 
The State invokes a recurring but specious assumption 
in arguing that Plateau's reliance on the State's actions and 
silence was unreasonable: that the "prevailing federal rate" for 
1 9
 As did the four other state coal lessees during the Audit 
Period (except for Consolidation Coal Company, which had an 
agreement with the State to pay at the rate of $.0175 per ton) 
(R. 156, 373, 503). 
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"lands of similar character" was somehow self-evident and easily 
discernible. For example, the State contends that Plateau was 
not entitled to rely on "erroneous" statements of a government 
employee (apparently referring to the representations of good 
standing), as if such an "error" should have been obvious to 
Plateau. Appellants1 Brief at 34. Another example of this theme 
is the State's assertion that estoppel will not operate in favor 
of one who has a convenient and available means of obtaining 
knowledge of the "actual" facts. Id. However, the most stunning 
example of the State's misdirected assumption is its contention 
that the State relied on Plateau to "accurately report and 
accurately pay the correct royalty amount," and therefore that 
Plateau, and not the State, should be estopped. These arguments 
simply ignore the fact that the prevailing federal rate clause is 
ambiguous and is not susceptible to a single "accurate" and 
"correct" interpretation. The fact that Plateau had federal coal 
leases with a royalty of 8% did not make it apparent to Plateau 
that 8% was the "correct" royalty rate under the State Lease. 
Under the State's theory, Plateau could never be sure that it was 
paying the "correct" royalty because any interpretation of the 
"prevailing federal rate" made by Plateau could later be chal-
lenged by the State as erroneous. 
In addition, Cyprus relied on the State's 
representations of good standing and its failure to notify Cyprus 
of any deficiency when Cyprus purchased Plateau in 1985. The 
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State has argued that Cyprus1 reliance was unreasonable because 
Cyprus was aware that the State had conducted a field audit of 
Plateau in early 1985, but did not inquire as to the status of 
the audit (R. 370). However, Plateau was regularly audited by 
governmental entities. A field audit was not an event which 
would cause Cyprus or Plateau to be concerned that royalty 
payments had been deficient (R. 500), especially when Cyprus 
conducted a search of the State Lease file and was told by the 
Division that the lease was in good standing. 
Plateau and Cyprus simply had no reason to question the 
State's acts, representations and silence, given the ambiguity of 
the prevailing federal rate clause and the parties1 long-standing 
course of performance. Thus, their reliance was reasonable and, 
as pointed out below, will result in great injury of the State if 
not estopped. 
(c) Injury. Plateau was under no obligation to 
mine coal under the State Lease. Had the State asserted its 
present position at any time during the Audit Period, Plateau 
would have ceased mining the coal subject to the State Lease and 
would have pursued other options, including mining other coal 
subject to a royalty rate lower than 8% (R. 150-51). Had the 
State asserted its present position early in 1985 when Cyprus was 
contemplating the purchase of Plateau, Cyprus could have pursued 
other avenues that are now foreclosed, such as either not 
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purchasing Plateau or purchasing it on different economic terms 
(R. 150). 
If the State is allowed to repudiate its actions and 
statements that the royalty rate is $0.15 per ton and is allowed 
to exact its claimed royalty at the rate of 8%, and collect 
interest and penalties, Plateau will be injured in the amount of 
approximately $3,000,000, plus additional interest. If Plateau 
is required to pay this amount to the State, it will have mined 
the State Lease at a substantial loss, because mining the coal 
subject to the State Lease during the Audit Period at an 8% 
royalty rate would result in a negative cash flow of $1.70 on 
every single ton of coal mined during that period, and that 
figure does not include costs for capital replacements. This 
would mean a negative cash flow over the Audit Period of 
$1,810,408.20 (R. 150-51, 371, 501). In light of these facts, 
the State's assertion that "paying what is owed under the lease 
is not an injury," Appellants1 Brief at 34, not only begs the 
question of what was "owed," it is patently ridiculous. 
The State asserts that it disputed the facts demon-
strating injury to Plateau by attaching Exhibits 7 to 10 to its 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Appellants1 Brief at 35. Exhibits 
7 and 8 (R. 416, 419) are internal Plateau memoranda that the 
State obtained through discovery. In its motion, the State 
asserted, without further elaboration, that these documents show 
that the royalty rate was not a consideration in choosing to mine 
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the State Lease (R. 317). However, these documents, if at all 
probative, reflect that the royalty was a consideration in mining 
the State Lease and further that the royalty rate of $0.15 per 
ton was the only positive factor in favor of mining the State 
Lease. (See, e.g., R. 422.) Exhibit 9 (R. 424-25) is a newspa-
per clipping that the State asserted shows the profit Plateau was 
making on all its mining operations (R. 371). Such irrelevant 
and hearsay evidence does not create an issue of fact in the face 
of the affidavits submitted by Plateau showing that the mining of 
coal under the State Lease was barely profitable (R. 211-15, 
265-67). Exhibit 10 (R. 426-30) is a monthly report which the 
State asserted shows that mining the State Lease at 8% would have 
been profitable (R. 371-72). As Plateau pointed out, however, 
Exhibit 10 (and also Exhibit 11), summarize information for 
Plateau's entire mining operations during the periods stated in 
the reports, which included mining under other leases (R. 
501-02). They do not reflect that mining coal under the State 
Lease at 8% would have been profitable. The trial court properly 
found that the State's exhibits failed to raise an issue of fact 
and agreed that Plateau would show a substantial loss on all 
mining activity under the State Lease if the State is allowed to 
retroactively impose an 8% royalty (R. 679). 
A private party would be estopped in this case, and 
because the State acted in a proprietary capacity, it should be 
treated no differently than a private lessor. However, should 
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the Court find that the State acted in a governmental capacity, 
the two additional requirements for estopping the State, manifest 
injustice to Plateau and lack of a substantial adverse effect on 
public policy, are also present in this case. 
4. Manifest Injustice to Plateau Will Result if the 
State is Not Estopped, 
Had the State timely informed Plateau that it believed 
8% to be the applicable royalty rate, the State Lease would not 
have been mined because it would have been unprofitable to do so, 
and the State would have received no royalty (R. 150-51). 
Accordingly, the Division's current assertion that 8% was the 
appropriate royalty rate, if successful, can only result in a 
windfall to the State. The State would receive an 8% royalty 
from a leasehold that, because of poor quality of reserves or 
other reasons, does not justify such a rate and would never have 
been mined at that rate. And it will receive that windfall at 
the expense of Plateau, which mined the coal reasonably believing 
that the appropriate rate was $0.15 per ton and anticipating that 
under such a rate it would receive a reasonable return for its 
efforts. If the State is successful in its current assertion, 
monies earned by Plateau from mining the State Lease, and then 
some, will be shifted to the State's coffers in the form of a 
windfall. An 8% royalty rate would increase Plateau's royalty 
obligation twelve to thirteen-fold. Such a result would clearly 
be unjust. 
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5. Estopping the State Will Not Impair the State's 
Ability to Manage School Trust Lands. Nor Will 
Denying the State a Windfall at Plateau's Expense 
Have a Substantial Adverse Impact on Public 
Policy, 
The core of the State's argument is that the Utah 
Enabling Act and the Utah Constitution somehow require that the 
State receive 8% of value under the State Lease. Specifically, 
the State has argued that it cannot be estopped, no matter how 
egregious its conduct or the injury to Plateau, because the 
school fund would be denied additional revenue for coal mined by 
Plateau during the Audit Period. However, a rule absolutely 
proscribing the application of estoppel when adverse impacts on 
the school trust fund might result would be unprecedented and 
would be contrary to this Court's view as expressed in Celebrity 
Club, Sutro & Co. and Morgan. Moreover, the absolute bar to 
estoppel sought by the State would not be limited to coal leases 
on school trust lands. What the State seeks is nothing less than 
a rule which would give it free reign to repudiate any and all 
past contractual obligations and agency regulations concerning 
the disposition of state lands whenever it concludes after the 
fact that it did not get the best bargain it could have. Such a 
rule offends all notions of fairness and should be rejected. 
The State's "trust" argument, if relevant at all when 
the State acted in a proprietary capacity, should be considered 
within the analytical framework of Celebrity Club and Sutro & Co. 
In other words, the only issue is whether denying the school fund 
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additional revenues for coal mined during the Audit Period in any 
way impairs the State's ability to manage school lands or amounts 
to a substantial adverse effect on public policy. 
(a) Estopping the State will not impair its 
ability to manage school trust lands. Estopping the State in 
this case will prevent it from retroactively asserting its 
recently formed interpretation of the prevailing federal rate 
clause, and nothing more. The State incorrectly asserts that a 
ruling against it would result in "an ongoing loss of more than 
$2.00 per ton for coal produced after the audit." Appellants' 
Brief at 18. This is clearly impossible because Plateau discon-
tinued mining the State Lease before the end of the Audit Period 
(R. 146). As the District Court noted, "the State can still 
proceed to lease coal lands on any terms it feels profitable and 
that will give the State the maximum return. They still have the 
power to revise the wording of their coal leases to do away with 
any ambiguity and to carry out any legally established policy" 
(R. 679). 
(b) Estopping the State Will Not Have a Substan-
tial Adverse Effect on Public Policy. Two of this Court's 
decisions, when read together, indicate what does not constitute 
a substantial adverse effect on public policy. In First Equity 
Corp. v. Utah State Univ.y 544 P.2d 887 (Utah 1975), a stock 
broker brought an action against Utah State University ("USU") to 
recover commissions and other losses incurred because USU refused 
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to accept and pay for shares of stock which a USU officer 
ordered. The court held the contract between USU and the broker 
was void, not because it was expressly prohibited, but because 
there was nothing in Utah law that expressly or impliedly permit-
ted a state university to invest in common stock. The court 
therefore held that because the contract was ultra vires and 
void, the stock broker could not recover. Id. at 893. 
Utah State Univ. v. Sutro & Co,, 646 P.2d 715 (Utah 
1982), involved the flip-side of the dispute in First Equity. 
This time, USU brought an action against several stock brokers to 
recover losses sustained by USU as a result of its investment 
program, the same program that had been previously held unautho-
rized and therefore null and void in First Equity. The stock 
brokers argued that USU was estopped from attempting to recover 
these losses. This Court held that the stock brokers were 
entitled to present facts in support of their estoppel claim at 
the trial level, even though USU was acting as a trustee in 
managing state funds. id. at 717, 720-21. The Court reasoned 
that there are two types of contracts or activities on the part 
of the state: (1) those that are "malum in se, or which are 
strictly prohibited by statute, and thus may be strongly against 
public policy," and (2) those such as the contracts with the 
brokers that were not authorized by law but which were not 
"inherently evil." Id. at 719. The court stated: 
In the former class of cases, it is quite 
universally held that no estoppel will lie 
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against the government, whereas in activities 
which are merely ultra vires the courts are 
more likely to allow such a defense; and this 
is also true of situations when the govern-
mental entity engages in proprietary or 
business activities. 
Id. Thus, even though the contracts were void and unenforceable 
and contrary to public policy, and resulted in substantial losses 
of school funds, the brokers were entitled to assert estoppel 
against USU when it sought to recover its losses under the 
contracts. In light of First Equity and Sutro & Co., denying the 
State the windfall it seeks here cannot be considered a substan-
tial adverse effect on public policy, even when the effect might 
20 be to deny the school fund some unspecified sum of money. 
The State argues that its acceptance of $0.15 per ton 
during the Audit Period was contrary to the Utah Enabling Act and 
Constitution. See Appellants* Brief at 30. However, nothing in 
either of these enactments strictly prohibited the State from 
accepting $0.15 per ton. Kadish v. Arizona State Land Dept., 155 
Ariz. 484, 747 P.2d 1183 (1987), upon which the State relies for 
the proposition that a flat $0.15 per ton rate would be 
2 0
 The State's assertion that the school trust fund would lose 
over three million dollars is based on several incorrect assump-
tions. This amount includes the interest and penalty assessed 
against Plateau. As noted infra at pages 66-69, the District 
Court concluded as a matter of law that the State was not enti-
tled to those sums. Moreover, the State assumes that 8% was the 
federal rate prevailing on lands of similar character. However, 
the District Court's ruling made it unnecessary to determine the 
prevailing federal rate during the Audit Period. 
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"impermissible" and "unconstitutional," Appellants' Brief at 17, 
23, is not applicable here. Kadish interpreted the Arizona-New 
Mexico Enabling Act and the Arizona Constitution, which specifi-
cally provide that no minerals and other products of school trust 
lands may be sold for less than their "appraised . . . true 
value." 747 P.2d at 1186. The court held a statute providing 
for a flat 5% royalty on minerals was unconstitutional under 
these provisions. Id. at 1196. 
Unlike the Arizona-New Mexico Enabling Act and the 
Arizona Constitution, the Utah Enabling Act and Constitution do 
not expressly and have never been interpreted to impose any 
substantive or procedural restrictions on the manner in which the 
State disposes of trust lands. The only restriction is found in 
section 10 of the Utah Enabling Act and article X, section 3 of 
the Utah Constitution, which require that proceeds from lands 
received under the Enabling Act be used to support the public 
schools. These laws left it to the Utah Legislature to prescribe 
procedures and requirements for the disposal of school lands. 
See Utah Const, art. XX, S 1 (school lands to be disposed of as 
may be provided by law). The legislature in turn left it to the 
Board and Division of State Lands to establish royalty rates. 
See Utah Code Ann. S 65-1-18 (1986) (repealed by Trust Land 
Management Act, 1988 Utah Laws ch. 121, effective July 1, 1988). 
There is no support for the contention that the State's accep-
tance of $0.15 per ton is "strictly prohibited" by law. 
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The State argues that the Utah Enabling Act and Consti-
tution implicitly limit the State's authority in establishing 
royalty rates, i.e,f that the State did not have the authority to 
accept less than "fair market value," in disposing of minerals 
from school lands. See Appellants' Brief at 28-29. The cases 
cited by the State for the proposition that the Utah Enabling Act 
and Constitution require the receipt of "full" or "fair market 
value" involved state agency actions or state statutes that were 
deemed inconsistent with various other enabling acts and state 
constitutions. See Appellants1 Brief at 12-16. As noted above, 
Kadish involved a statute that was found contrary to particular 
provisions in the Arizona Constitution and Enabling Act. As 
Plateau has pointed out, however, the Utah Enabling Act and 
Constitution do not include any provisions related to the manner 
of disposing of state lands or the value that must be obtained 
therefrom. Nor have these provisions been interpreted to impose 
a general duty to obtain "full" or "fair market" value, however 
those terms may be defined. 
Moreover, this Court need not decide whether these laws 
impose such a duty on the State, because even assuming that they 
21 do, and assuming the State breached such a duty in this case, 
21
 As discussed further below, even if the State had a duty to 
obtain fair market value, however that may be defined, there has 
been no showing that such a duty has been breached in this case. 
An issue of fact exists as to the fair market value of coal mined 
under the State Lease during the audit period. See infra p. 53. 
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the State is still estopped. Any adverse impact on public policy 
in this case would be of no different nature or degree than that 
in Sutro & Co. Both cases involved actions of state officials, 
acting as trustees, that resulted in losses of comparable magni-
tude to various school funds. Moreover, in this case if the 
State had asserted an 8% royalty during the Audit Period, Plateau 
would not have mined coal under the State Lease and the State 
would have received no royalty. Allowing the State to repudiate 
its past actions and to obtain such a windfall is strongly 
against public policy; estopping the State is not. 
The cases cited by the State do not establish that 
estopping the State here would have a substantial adverse effect 
on public policy. In State ex rel Commfrs of Land Office v. 
Phillips Petroleum, 258 P.2d 1193 (Okla. 1953), the court refused 
to estop the state after it had, through a clerical error, 
conveyed a mineral interest along with the surface estate in 
certain school trust lands. In Phillips Petroleum, the equities 
were clearly not in favor of the party asserting estoppel: an 
examination of the Notice of Sale for the land, which clearly 
reserved the mineral interest, or the rules and regulations 
governing the sale would have revealed the error. Id. at 
1199-1200. The court also noted that the actions of the state 
agency in this case, i.e., the giving away of the mineral inter-
est were "clearly" beyond the authority of that agency. Id. at 
1200. 
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Phillips is thus distinguishable factually and in terms 
of the law it applied. It is clear under Sutro & Co. that 
unauthorized acts alone do not bar the application of estoppel 
against the State. On the contrary, Utah law calls for a balanc-
ing test in this situation. If the facts of Phillips were before 
this Court, it might well find under this balancing approach that 
the State should not be estopped. But in this case, the balance 
is in favor of Plateau: the elements of estoppel are satisfied; 
the injury to Plateau is manifest; there was nothing about the 
State's conduct that was "clearly" beyond its authority. More-
over, the State's actions, even under its "breach of trust duty" 
theory, were not so strictly and clearly prohibited by law as to 
be strongly against public policy. Phillips does not, as 
asserted by the State, support a rule against applying estoppel 
to the State simply because school trust lands are involved. 
The same is true of State v. Northwest Maqnesite Co. , 
28 Wash. 2d 1, 182 P.2d 643 (1947). In Northwest Maqnesite, a 
mineral lease provided for a royalty of 4% of the receipts from 
the sale of minerals after deducting costs of treatment and 
transportation. This method of calculating royalties was explic-
itly required by statute. However, the lessee and the commis-
sioner of state lands agreed that royalties should be paid based 
on 4% of receipts after deducting mining costs as well as treat-
ment and transportation costs, in direct contravention of the 
lease and the statute. The court stated three bases for its 
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refusal to estop the state from recovering royalties as provided 
in the lease rather than the agreement: the commissioner's 
promise was contrary to an express legislative enactment; the 
commissioner did not have authority to enter into the agreement; 
and the lessee did not present sufficient evidence to establish 
the elements of estoppel, and particularly did not show that 
estopping the state was necessary to prevent manifest injustice. 
Id. at 656-58. Far from establishing a per se rule against 
estopping the state because of its "trust duty," the Northwest 
Maqnesite court closely examined the facts of the case and 
22 
decided that estoppel was simply not justified. Northwest 
Maqnesite, therefore, does not support the State's argument. 
In Department of State Lands v. Pettibone, 702 P.2d 948 
(Mont. 1985), the issue was whether the lessee of school land 
acquired ownership of water diverted or developed on the land. 
Id. at 952. The court held that, because water rights acquired 
become appurtenant to land, they became the property of the State 
and not the lessee. Because the leases did not include payment 
for the water right, the court wou-d not imply a sale of the 
2 2
 Among the key facts the court relied on were the following: 
the agreement was clearly and directly in contravention of the 
lease and a state statute; the evidence showed that the lessee 
did not rely on the agreement; and there was no evidence that the 
lessee was injured. Id. at 657-58. As Plateau has shown in this 
case, the State's actions were not clearly contrary to the State 
Lease or any statutes; Plateau justifiably relied on the State's 
actions; and Plateau will suffer clear injury if the State is not 
estopped. 
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water to the lessee. Id. at 955. A secondary issue was whether 
the state should be estopped from asserting an interest in the 
water. The court noted thatr because of the trust doctrine, the 
state had no power to grant the lessees the right to develop 
non-appurtenant water rights; it also noted that the lessees had 
not detrimentally relied on any actions by the state. Id. at 
956-57. Thus, Pettiboner like the other cases on which the State 
relies, did not involve a strict rule against applying estoppel 
where school trust lands are involved, but rather was based on 
considerations specific to the facts at hand. These cases are 
not dispositive of the present case, in which a balancing test 
must be applied to the specific facts. 
In sum, this Court should not depart from prior Utah 
case law by holding that estoppel can never be applied when the 
school land trust would be denied additional revenue. Rather, 
the Court should hold that denying the State the windfall it 
seeks in this case is not a substantial adverse impact on public 
policy. The Court should also hold that the undisputed facts of 
this case support estoppel against the State, and that the 
injustice to Plateau if the State is allowed to assert its 8% 
theory retroactively is readily apparent. In short, the Court 
should uphold the District Court's finding that the State is 
estopped from retroactively invoking the prevailing federal rate 
clause. 
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individual consideration of leases to determine whether 8% was 
the prevailing rate for "lands of a similar character" is neces-
sary. The State need not consider whether any federal leases 
were actually issued at the 8% rate or, of those that were 
issued, whether any of them covered lands of a character similar 
to lands covered by the state leases. In addition, the State 
need not consider the effect of existing federal leases with 
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royalty rates of less than 8%. 
Prior to its October 1985 demand for additional royal-
ties, the State had pursued a different course; it accepted 
royalties at the $0.15 per ton rate from all but one of its 
lessees, with no suggestion that the higher 8% rate should apply. 
In one instance, the State reached a prior agreement with its 
lessee, Consolidation Coal Company ("Consol"), that a royalty 
rate of $0,175 per ton should apply (R. 156, 373, 503). This 
agreement, reached in 1981, was based upon an individual assess-
ment of the federal prevailing rate for lands of a character 
similar to that covered by Consol's lease. In reaching this 
agreement, the State relied upon an existing federal lease with a 
royalty rate of $0,175 per ton; the Division made no reference to 
FCLAA or the 8% rate it now contends was applicable during that 
time period (R. 156, 293, 373, 503). The State's treatment of 
2 3
 The State!s interpretation is also nonsensical. See infra 
p. 73. 
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It attempted to apply the new policy retroactively to all royalty 
payments that were outstanding because of a separate dispute 
between the Department and its lessees* The court summarily 
dismissed the Department's contention that such a policy could be 
applied retroactively: 
As for the government's claim that the Secre-
tary might recompute the gas royalties owing 
where lessees had not paid the bills previ-
ously rendered, in other words, make his June 
7, 1937 order retroactive, we think the 
[trial] court correctly construed the provi-
sion of the lease permitting the Secretary to 
fix the value of gas for royalty purposes as 
operating prospectively only. Statutes are 
always so construed. We think that a con-
tract provision as extraordinary as is this 
authorization to fix values, should no less 
be interpreted as having prospective opera-
tion only. 
Id. at 821 (citation omitted). The State is in no different a 
position than the federal government was in Continental Oil. It 
cannot, after a long-standing practice of accepting $0.15 per ton 
as the applicable royalty rate under the state leases, change 
that policy retroactively to the detriment of its lessees. 
In determining whether an agency may apply a new policy 
retroactively, the courts consider whether the retroactivity is 
reasonable under the circumstances. That reasonableness is ana-
lyzed under a balancing test, which weighs the "ill effect of the 
retroactive application" against the "mischief of producing a 
result which is contrary to a statutory design or to legal and 
equitable principles" if the policy is not retroactively applied. 
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Securities Exchange Comm'n v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 
(1947). 
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Id. at 390. 
111II"II I i rst two factors set forth i 11 Retail Union , 
v h e t he i Mini1 f ii< in", n l I! H i " , ! i n s e i m n l i m p r F S S i o n " i i i n l wh iM lm 
the new rule departs t roiu established practice UJ merely dttemp.. 
to till tj \'oid i n an unse11 1 ed area of law, have similar pu 
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party's reliance on the prior state ul I In- In *, did the relying 
pa- lirivp not ice ot the pending change in policy. See e.q^, al 
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The State Lease was issued with a Board approved roy-
alty rate of $0*15 per ton. Until October of 1985, the State's 
statements and actions confirmed that this would be the applica-
ble royalty rate under the lease until that rate was changed by a 
contrary determination or agreement between the parties. The 
State never deviated from this policy until October of 1985. 
Because this long-standing practice gave the State's lessees no 
notice of its subsequent change in policy, the lessees were enti-
tled to rely upon the former practice and their reliance cer-
tainly was reasonable. 
At an early date, the United States Supreme Court 
established that parties may rely on a long-standing agency prac-
tice and that such practices are to be given the effect of law 
and "considered binding on past transactions." United States v. 
McDaniel, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 1 (1833). In McDaniel, the Court 
determined that the practice of paying additional money to an 
agency employee for the performance of duties outside of his reg-
ular employment was an established "usage." Although there was 
no authority for this additional payment, the government was not 
allowed to retroactively recover for the compensation paid to the 
employee. w[0]f necessity, usages have been established in every 
department of the government, which have become a kind of common 
law, and regulate the rights and duties of those who act within 
their respective limits. And no change of such usages can have a 
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could not retroactively apply a new policy to invalidate lease 
drawing cards that complied with the prior practice. 653 F.2d at 
1044-45. As discussed supra at pages 10-17, the royalty provi-
sion of the State Lease is ambiguous. Faced with the inherent 
ambiguities of the prevailing federal rate clause and the uncer-
tainty regarding how that clause would be effectuated, Plateau's 
reliance on the agency's long-standing practice of accepting 
$0.15 per ton as the applicable royalty rate under the lease must 
be viewed as a reasonable response to these uncertainties. 
The next two factors to be considered under the Retail 
Union balancing test, the extent of a party's reliance on the 
prior rule and the degree of burden which the retroactive order 
imposes on the party, are similar to the detrimental reliance 
aspect of the estoppel doctrine discussed supra at pages 37-39. 
As discussed in that section, both Plateau and Cyprus relied on 
the State's prior policy, and if the State is now allowed to 
alter that policy retroactively, they will be unfairly penalized 
for that reliance. As one court has observed: 
[An agency] decision branding as "unfair" 
conduct stamped "fair" at the time a party 
acted, raises judicial hackles . . . . And 
the hackles bristle still more when a finan-
cial penalty is assessed for action that 
might well have been avoided if the agency's 
changed disposition had been earlier made 
known . . . . 
NLRB v. Majestic Weaving Co., 355 F.2d 854, 860 (2d Cir. 1966) 
(citations omitted). Here, the financial penalties imposed on 
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P. The District Court Properly Found that 
the State's New Royalty Policy is a Rule 
which is Invalid Because of the State's 
Failure to Follow the Provisions of the 
Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
Under the provisions of the 1985 Utah Administrative 
Rulemaking Actf which was in effect when the State announced its 
new royalty policy, Utah agencies that adopt new rules must fol-
low the procedures specified in that Act. Utah Code Ann. 
S 63-46a-3 (1986). The Act defined a rule as 
a statement made by an agency that applies to 
a general class of persons, rather than spe-
cific persons and: (i) implements or inter-
prets policy made by statute; or (ii) pre-
scribes the policy of the agency in the 
absence of express statutory policy. . . . 
Id. § 63-46a-2 (8) (a) (current version, as amended in 1987 and 
1988 provides that rule "applies to a class of persons or an 
agency"). The State's new royalty policy requiring an 8% royalty 
rate under all of the leases having royalty provisions similar to 
that contained in the State Lease is a rule within the meaning of 
this statute. Therefore, it cannot be adopted either prospec-
tively or retrospectively without compliance with the rulemaking 
procedures of the statute. 
In Williams v. Public Service Commfn, 720 P.2d 773 
(Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court applied the provisions of an 
earlier version of the Rulemaking Act to a Public Service Commis-
sion decision that it had no jurisdiction to regulate one-way 
mobile telephone paging services. In that case, the Commission 
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"rule" was revised in 1985; at the time Williams was decided, the 
statute provided that a rule is a statement that applies to a 
"general class of persons rather than specific persons"; however, 
the Court observed that its conclusion would not be different 
were it to analyze the matter under the latter statute. Id. at 
775 n.7. 
Under the rationale of the Williams case, the State's 
new royalty policy announced in October of 1985 was a rule, 
which, absent compliance with the procedures of the Rulemaking 
Act, is invalid and may not be applied prospectively, much less 
retrospectively. As with the policy considered in the Williams 
case, the royalty policy, which affects all lessees having leases 
containing the royalty provision at issue here, affects a "class 
of persons." The policy prescribes the policy of the agency and 
it represents a clear departure from the prior practice of the 
agency. Under these circumstances, the State should not be 
allowed to enforce its policy, either prospectively or retrospec-
tively, until it complies with the Rulemaking Act. 
G. The State Waived Whatever Right It Had to 
Demand Payment of Royalties on Coal Mined 
During the Audit Period at Any Rate Higher 
than $0.15 Per Ton. 
The Utah Supreme Court has defined waiver as "the 
intentional relinquishment of a known right. To constitute a 
waiver, there must be an existing right, benefit or advantage, a 
knowledge of its existence, and an intention to relinquish it. 
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extend, the Supreme Court of Kansas held that the landlord waived 
its right to tax increase payments. _Id. at 80. 
Similarly, Plateau submitted to the State royalty 
payments and coal production and settlement transmittals that 
clearly reflected that payments were made at the rate of $0.15 
per ton. Prior to 1985, the State did not object to the amount 
or to the rate of royalty payments. Further, as discussed supra 
at page 24, the State indicated that it would take no action to 
increase the $0.15 per ton rate until the lease was up for 
readjustment. Thus, the Division voluntarily relinquished, and 
consequently waived, its right to demand royalty payments at a 
rate higher than $0.15 per ton. 
H. The District Court Properly Found that 
the State May Not Apply its Interest and 
Penalty Rules to the State Lease. 
In the event that this case is remanded and it is found 
that Plateau owes the State any additional royalties, it must be 
determined what, if any, penalties and interest are owed. The 
Court should therefore rule on the following issues only if it 
remands the case for a determination of the "prevailing federal 
rate.11 
1. Pursuant to the Express Terms of the State Lease, 
the State May Not Impose the Terms of the Novem-
ber, 1982 Interest Rule on Any Royalty Payment 
Deficiencies Should Such Deficiencies be Found to 
Exist. 
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The State has demanded accrued interest on the alleg-
edly past-due royalties in the amount of $1,058,542.32. This 
amount represents interest at the statutory rate of 6% for the 
period from January, 1979 through June, 1981; at the statutory 
rate of 10% for the period from July, 1981 through November, 1982 
and at the regulatory rate of 18%, based upon a rule adopted by 
the Board on November 4, 1982, for the period from December, 1982 
through October, 1985. 
Article I of the State Lease provides: "This lease is 
granted subject in all respects to and under the conditions of 
. . . existing rules and regulations and such operating rules and 
regulations as may be hereafter approved and adopted by the State 
Land Board" (emphasis added). Section 65-1-96 of the Utah Code 
provides that all mineral leases issued by the Board prior to 
1967 shall be subject to the conditions and provisions contained 
in the leases. Thus, the State Lease is only subject to rules 
and regulations existing as of March 15, 1965 (the date of the 
State Lease) and "operating" rules and regulations adopted 
thereafter by the Board. 
The Board had no rule or regulation regarding interest 
when the State Lease was issued. Thus, there is no regulation 
regarding interest which can be applied to this lease. Further-
more, the Board's 1982 interest rule cannot be applied to this 
lease, because it cannot be characterized as an "operating" rule. 
The Utah Supreme Court holds that all words must, if possible, be 
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given their usual and ordinary meaning. Commercial Building 
Corp. v. Blair, 565 P.2d 776, 778 (Utah 1977). There is no 
reason not to give the word "operating" its ordinary meaning in 
the context of this state minerals lease. The usual and ordinary 
meaning of "operating" is "engaged in some form of operation." 
Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1971). 
The Board's 1982 interest rule is not a rule that 
governs the lessee's actions or operations on the land. If the 
interest rule is an "operating" rule or regulation, it is diffi-
cult to envision which of the Board's rules or regulation are 
"non-operating" and why the Board chose to make a distinction 
between operating and non-operating rules and regulations in 
drafting the State Lease. The authority to impose new "operat-
ing" rules and regulations on lessees provides the Board with the 
opportunity to regulate mining activities on leased lands that 
might adversely affect the state's mineral reserves, the public 
health and safety or the environment. The 1982 interest rule 
clearly does not fall within the ambit of this retention of 
authority. Thus, it cannot be applied to any royalty deficien-
cies which may be due under the State Lease. 
2. Defendants Are Not Entitled to Interest on Any 
Alleged Royalty Payment Deficiencies for Periods 
of Time Prior to Defendants' First Demand for 
Payment of the Alleged Deficiencies, 
No interest charge, whether based on statute or regula-
tion, may accrue in this case until a demand is made for the 
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principal. This rule was adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Staker v. Huntington Cleveland Irrigation Co., 664 P.2d 1188, 
1191 (Utah 1983), which involved a claim for overpayments made by 
mistake to an irrigation company. The Court ruled that the 
prejudgment interest award should only run from the date that the 
plaintiff demanded the return of the overpayment and not from the 
date that the overpayment was made. Accordingly, since the 
Division did not make a demand for alleged royalty underpayments 
until October 15, 1985, it has no right to interest, if any, 
until after the date of the demand. 
3. Pursuant to the Express Terms of the State Lease, 
Defendants May Not Impose the Terms of the Decem-
ber, 1983 Penalty Rule for Any Royalty Payment 
Deficiencies that this Court May Find to Exist. 
The State has demanded payment of a 6% penalty based on 
a rule adopted by the Board in December, 1983. The argument set 
forth above with respect to the Board1s November 4, 1982 interest 
rule is also applicable to the penalty rule: the Board had no 
penalty rule when the State Lease was issued and the Board's 1983 
penalty regulation cannot be characterized as an "operating" 
rule. Since the State Lease was granted subject only to existing 
regulations and such operating regulations as may be adopted by 
the Board, the 1983 penalty rule is not applicable to the State 
Lease. 
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III. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE 
STATE1S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
The District Court denied the State's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment (R. 680), wherein the State requested 
the court to find as a matter of law that 8% of gross sales value 
was the applicable royalty under the prevailing federal rate 
clause of the State Lease during the Audit Period (R. 355). The 
District Court's decision was proper because the Record shows 
there were facts in dispute necessary to the State's motion. 
Furthermore, the State failed to assert necessary facts in 
support of its Motion, including support for its assertion that 
the prevailing federal royalty rate was 8%. 
A. Plateau Raised Specific Issues Showing 
That There Are Genuine Issues For Trial. 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure pro-
vides in part: 
The judgment sought shall be rendered forth-
with if the pleadings, depositions, answers 
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
Foremost among the State's material facts which Plateau 
controverted is the following: The State asserted that the 
"federal royalty rate on leases issued since 1979 in Utah has 
been the same regardless of location, quality of coal, etc" (R. 
361). The State's own authority controverts this assertion and 
shows that such royalty rates ranged from 5% to 12.5% (R. 496). 
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Furthermore, the State's assertion assumes that a change in the 
royalty rate pursuant to the prevailing federal rate clause is to 
be based only on newly issued leases. This interpretation does 
not comport with a plain reading of the clause which instead 
indicates that the rate is to be based on federal coal leases in 
effect at the beginning of the quarter. See infra, pp. 72-73. 
The royalty rates for federal coal leases in effect during the 
Audit Period ranged from $0.10 per ton to 12.5% of value in Utah 
and across the nation. 
B. The State Failed To Assert Facts In 
Support Of Its Motion For Partial Sum-
mary Judgment. 
Among the facts which the State failed to assert in 
support of its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment are the 
following: 
1. Facts establishing that the leases referred to in 
Exhibit 1 to the Affidavit of Robert Lopez (attached as an 
exhibit to Defendants' Summary Judgment Memorandum) (R. 468) are 
for "land of similar character" or are otherwise relevant to the 
prevailing federal rate clause. 
2. Facts establishing that 8% was the "prevailing 
rate" for "coal leases issued by the United States." 
3. Facts establishing that 8% was the prevailing rate 
for federal coal leases for land of a similar character in effect 
at the beginning of each quarter of the Audit Period. 
-71-
In sum, because Plateau raised genuine issues of 
material fact and because the State did not establish facts 
supporting its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the District 
Court properly denied the State's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment. 
C. It Cannot Be Said That The Prevailing 
Federal Royalty Rate During The Audit 
Period Was 8%. 
The State argues that the meaning of the royalty 
provision is clear and that the prevailing federal rate clause 
requires payment of royalties at the rate of the majority of the 
federal coal leases newly issued during the Audit Period. 
According to the State, under FCLAA and the regulations promul-
gated thereunder, the prevailing rate for all underground federal 
coal leases after 1976 was 8% of the coal value. See supra p. 5 
n.4. The State claims that the majority of such leases were 
issued at the royalty rate of 8%, and that therefore the royalty 
rate payable under the royalty provision was 8%. 
Contrary to the State's position, the wording of the 
prevailing federal rate clause does not indicate that it refers 
2 4
 See Affidavit of Ralph Aiello, H 5 (R. 451), wherein Mr. 
Aiello, an auditor for the State, states, ff[a]fter reviewing 
Article III of the state coal lease regarding royalty rate [sic], 
I started gathering information to determine that royalty rate 
was required to be paid by the lessees since the leases required 
payment of 15 cents per ton or the rate charged for federal 
leases issued in the quarter the royalty was due on lands of sim-
ilar character, whichever was higher" (emphasis added). 
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only to newly issued leases, and the State offers no authority 
for such an interpretation. In addition, the clause does not 
refer to leases issued during the quarter but rather to leases 
issued "at the beginning of the quarter," which could mean that 
it refers to all leases issued before the beginning of the 
quarter. Consideration of all federal leases that were in effect 
during the reporting quarter would certainly comport with a plain 
reading of the clause and would result in a practical application 
of the clause. 
The State's interpretation that the clause refers only 
to newly issued leases issued in Utah during the reporting period 
is also nonsensical. Application of this interpretation would 
result in a royalty rate payable under the lease of $0.15 for 
some reporting quarters when no new federal leases were issued, 
but 8% for other quarters when federal leases were issued. 
Specifically, as set forth in Appendix XVI to Plateau's Reply 
Memorandum (R. 597), Plateau was in production during 22 of the 
23 quarters during the Audit Period. There were newly issued 
leases during only 10 out of 22 producing quarters. Thus, 
application of the State's interpretation of the royalty provi-
sion would result in a royalty rate of 8% for 10 quarters and 
$0.15 per ton for 12 quarters. 
The State has not submitted facts showing that 8% was 
the prevailing rate for federal coal leases of land of similar 
character in effect during the Audit Period. The underground 
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royalty rates for such leases varied between $0.10 per ton and 
12.5% of value (R. 496). A trial would be necessary to determine 
the prevailing rate for coal leases of land of similar character 
during the Audit Period. 
CONCLUSION 
When the State Lease was issued in 1965, it was issued 
at the fixed royalty rate of $0.15 per ton. Plateau paid, and 
the State received, royalty payments at the rate of $0.15 per ton 
on coal mined under the State Lease from 1965 through 1984. The 
Division did not object to the amount of royalty payments or the 
royalty rate until 1985. The State represented to Plateau in 
1980 that the State Lease was in good standing. Plateau relied 
on these representations and the State's failure to object to 
royalty payments in choosing to mine coal under the State Lease. 
In 1985, after Plateau had discontinued mining the State Lease, 
Cyprus questioned the State as to whether there were any out-
standing liabilities associated with the State Lease. The State 
indicated that the lease was in good standing, and failed to 
inform Cyprus of the audit report findings. Cyprus relied on the 
State's representations and silence in acquiring Plateau. The 
State is now deviating from its twenty-year course of performance 
and is attempting to impose retroactively a novel interpretation 
of the State Lease which would injure Plateau in the amount of 
approximately $3,000,000.00. 
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Coal subject to the State Lease was of marginal quality 
and mining it was barely profitable under the rate actually paid. 
Mining the coal would not have been economic at a royalty rate 
higher than $0.15 per ton. Had the State demanded a higher rate 
at any time during the Audit Period, Plateau would have ceased 
mining under the State Lease, and thereafter the State would have 
received no royalties whatsoever. To give the State increased 
royalties would result in an unconscionable windfall to the 
State. 
This case is a textbook example of circumstances 
supporting estoppel against the State. The undisputed facts 
clearly support a holding that the State is estopped from demand-
ing any royalty payment other than the $0.15 per ton that it has 
already been paid. Any other ruling by the Court would result in 
a serious injustice to Plateau. The State's trust argument is 
overshadowed by this injustice and the fact that the school land 
trust would be poorer today if the State had asserted an 8% 
royalty during the Audit Period because Plateau would not have 
mined the State Lease. 
The findings and the judgment of the District Court are 
supported by the Record and should thus be upheld by the Court. 
If the Court finds that a royalty other than $0.15 was required 
to be paid by Plateau during the Audit Period, this case should 
be remanded to the District Court for factual findings on the 
royalty rate. 
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APPENDIX A 
FACTUAL ASSERTIONS OF THE STATE 
UNSUPPORTED BY THE RECORD 
Appellants' Brief at 4: "The Director, after a hearing, 
upheld the audit and the demand for payment." The State's 
citation to page 436 of the record does not support this 
assertion. 
Appellants' Brief at 4: "The United States Government owns 
most of the coal-producing lands within the State of Utah." 
Appellants' Brief at 5: "When State Lease no. 22729 was 
issued by the State, the royalty rate on many federal coal 
leases was $.15 per ton." 
Appellants' Brief at 5: "The federal coal lease royalty 
rate generally remained at $.15 per ton until August 4, 
1976." 
Appellants' Brief at 6: "Instead the State of Utah, as 
written in its lease provisions and regulations, requires 
its lessees to accurately provide information and to pay the 
correct amounts of royalties." 
Appellants' Brief at 7: "Plaintiffs, upon receipt of the 
audit report, requested a hearing before the Director of the 
Division of State Lands. A hearing was held." 
Appellants' Brief at 16: "The market royalty rate on coal 
leases, in the state of Utah, is controlled by the United 
States which has the vast majority of coal reserves. 
Lessees require long-term leases because of the capital 
expenditures involved." 
Appellants' Brief at 17: "The State therefore, drafted an 
escalator clause in its coal lease which tied the royalty 
revision to the prevailing federal rate. That escalator 
clause insured that the State would, throughout the term of 
the lease, receive full market value." 
Appellants' Brief at 18: " . . . with an ongoing loss of 
more than $2.00 per ton for coal produced after the audit." 
Appellants' Brief at 19: "A reading of the royalty provi-
sion in the lease (Article III Second) shows that it is 
clear and complies with the intent of the parties that the 
trust lands receive the going royalty rate. It states that 
the royalty rate will be $.15 per ton (which was the federal 
rate when the lease was signed). . ." 
11. Appellants' Brief at 20: "Plaintiffs have the duty to 
determine any change in the federal royalty rate." 
12. Appellants1 Brief at 20: "The federal government owns the 
majority of coal reserves in Utah." 
13. Appellants1 Brief at 21: "The Plaintiffs . . . concede that 
the federal rate is higher than the royalty payment they 
paid prior to 1976." 
14. Appellants' Brief at 23: "The Federal Government owns the 
majority of coal reserves in the State of Utah and therefore 
the royalty rate charged by the Federal Government consti-
tutes the prevailing market rate in the State of Utah. At 
the time the lease provision was drafted the federal royalty 
rate was generally $.15 per ton." 
15. Appellants' Brief at 23: "The escalator clause was required 
by law and the obvious intent of the parties, when the 
contract was entered into, was to provide a mechanism 
whereby the State would always receive the going market 
royalty rate from its trust lands." 
16. Appellants' Brief at 24: "One of the things that is certain 
about the royalty provision, in addition to the plain 
meaning of Subsection b, is that the contracting parties 
intended that the royalty rate would change if federal 
royalty rates increased." 
17. Appellants' Brief at 25: "Their silence concedes that the 
rate is something higher than $.15." 
18. Appellants' Brief at 25: In this particular case the 
undisputed facts establish that the prevailing federal rate 
is 8% of value. Any changes in the rate can be easily 
determined by review of Bureau of Land Management records." 
19. Appellants' Brief at 34: "Indeed, the undisputed facts show 
that it was the State that relied on the Plaintiffs to pay 
the correct royalty amount. The Plaintiffs had the duty to 
the State to calculate and pay the correct royalty. The 
State did not have a duty to Plaintiffs to collect the 
correct royalty although it has such a duty to the school 
trust." 
20. Appellants' Brief at 6: "The lands that the Division of 
State Lands manages have thousands of mineral leases." 
21. Appellants' Brief at 6: "Like reporting taxes, it has 
largely been an honor reporting system." 
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22. Appellants' Brief at 9: "The State has a . . . moral duty 
to obtain full value from the disposition of those lands." 
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APPENDIX B 
DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF 
THE STATE LEASE ROYALTY PROVISION 
Royalty Provision 
Language: To pay to Lessor 
15th day of the 
ter, royalty 
quarterly, on or before the 
month succeeding each quar-
(a) at the rate of 15£ per ton of 2000 
lbs. of coal produced for the 
leased premises and sold or other-
wise disposed off or 
(b) at the rate prevailing, at the 
beginning of the quarter for which 
payment is being made, for federal 
lessees of land of similar charac-
ter under coal leases issued by the 
United States at that time, 
whichever is higher . 
Ambiguous 
Phrase 
"at the rate prevailing" 
Different 
Interpretations 
1. the rate of the majority 
of leases 
2. an average of rates 
3. the highest rate 
'federal 
leases1 











all federal coal leases 



















the same drainage area 
federal coal leases 
the same mine 







"land of similar character11 Land with: 
1. similar geological or 
physical characteristics 
2. similar access character-
istics 
3. similar degree of devel-
opment completed 
4. coal with similar fuel 
utilization potential 
5. similar environmental or 
regulatory restrictions 
6. similar labor force 
availability 
"coal leases issued by the 1. all federal coal leases 
United States at that time" in effect on the date of 
the beginning of the 
reporting quarter 
2. all federal coal leases 
in effect during the 
reporting quarter 
3. all federal coal leases 
in effect during the 
Audit Period 
4. federal coal leases newly 
issued on the date of the 
beginning of the report-
ing quarter 
5. federal coal leases newly 
issued during the report-
ing quarter 
6. federal coal leases newly 
issued during the Audit 
Period 
072788A 
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